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2. Economic relations: A sugar 
cane, or a sugar-coated stick?
Ágnes Szunomár, Liisi Karindi and Andreea Leonte
CEE countries have increasingly perceived China as a country which could bring 
economic benefits to the region through developing trade relations, growing inflows 
of Chinese investment and recently also through infrastructure projects carried 
out by Chinese companies and financed from Chinese loans. This chapter examines 
China’s presence in CEE by mapping trade and investment relations, issues of con-
nectivity and infrastructure, financial cooperation and tourism.83
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on CEE countries remains small. However, it has increased 
significantly in the past decade leading to a number of challenges. Despite a politically 
driven warming up of bilateral relations, the trade relations remain relatively low, 
leading to increased deficit. Chinese FDI flows to the region are modest, concentrated 
in a few, mainly EU member countries. Infrastructural projects are negotiated all over 
the region but implemented ones are rare to find, while financial cooperation is also 
in its infancy yet. More and more Chinese tourists are visiting the region, however, 
it is not entirely clear whether this is a result of the 17+1 cooperation or due to the 
country’s expanding army of middle class travelers.
NOT SO SPECIAL: MODEST IMPACT OF 17+1 ON TRADE RELATIONS
A comparative analysis of 17 Central and Eastern European countries’ trade with 
China reveals that the majority of the countries (especially in the Baltic and the Bal-
kans) have a relatively low trade with China. Within the whole CEE region the four 
Visegrád countries show the highest trade flows, followed by Romania, Slovenia, 
Serbia and Bulgaria. A common feature of CEE trade with China is a considerable 
and – in the past fifteen years – steadily increasing deficit. In 2018 the deficit amounted 
to around 75 billion USD. As the V4 countries (especially Poland) receive the majority 
of Chinese exports, their deficit values are the highest as well. 
Trade between V4 countries and China has increased the most in the past few 
years, however, the increase dates back prior to the official launch of the 17+1 initiative: 
to the early 2000s, coinciding with the accession of CEE countries to the European 
Union. In the case of imports from China the platform indeed gave a new impetus 
to relations, however, while the V4’s imports from China increased substantially, 
the growth of V4’s exports to China remained rather modest after 2012, and even 
decreased slightly for a few years after 2014. As a result, the trade deficit increased 
rapidly. 
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In the case of the V4, especially Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, the export 
 depen dency on Germany is obvious: 25-30% of V4 exports are directed to Germany, 
while indirect exports (where goods are declared for export in, for example, Slova-
kia and leave the EU customs territory from Czechia) elevate this dependency even 
further.84 The products or spare parts are often exported to China from Germany. 
The fact that the three above-mentioned V4 countries are in a constant trade surplus 
with Germany may give a more nuanced picture on these countries’ trade deficit 
with China.
If we analyze the trends broken down by each of the V4 countries, the increase in 
Chinese imports since 2012 is the highest in the case of Poland and Czechia (79 and 
66%, respectively), while the increase in imports from Hungary and Slovakia is rather 
modest (18 and 14%). Slovakia’s imports even decreased for three years in a row after 
2014. When it comes to V4 countries’ export performance, the numbers are less im-
pressive: Czechia, Poland and Hungary export about the same value, while Slovakia 
lags behind. The export increase between 2012 and 2018 was the highest in the case 
of Czechia (above 50%) Poland (43%) and Hungary (31%) and shows a 7% decrease in 
the case of Slovakia. Although Polish, Czech or even Hungarian percentage numbers 
may suggest a significant increase in these countries’ exports to China, it has to be 
emphasized that they started from a very low initial export amount, where the ab-
solute change has still remained relatively small, therefore these numbers may give 
a misleading indication of countries’ relative performance and the role China plays 
as an export destination.85
GRAPH 1: TRADE BETWEEN THE VISEGRÁD REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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MAP 2: MAJOR COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM 17 CEE COUNTRIES TO CHINA
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In all V4 countries, the main import products from China are machinery and 
electronics. On the export side, V4 countries’ exports consist of product groups such 
as vehicles, machinery and electronics with the exception of Poland, where besides 
the aforementioned product groups, metals (such as refined copper and copper alloys) 
represent a significant portion of its exports to China. Although China’s hunger for 
high-quality agricultural products has been growing globally recently, the share of 
agricultural exports is not significant: below 6% in Poland’s and Czechia’s total exports 
to China, and less than 3 and 1%, respectively, in the case of Hungary and Slovakia.
When examining the patterns of trade between China and the V4 in the past fif-
teen years, it has slightly changed as well. These structural changes are characterized 
by a sharp rise in exports of high-tech products, increasing the high technology inten-
sity of trade. The high-tech exports volume and share to China has been the highest 
in the case of Hungary. However, the high technology intensity of trade is mainly 
due to the large flows of automotive, electronics and telecommunications products, 
based on the activity of multinational companies in global production networks, not 
in local companies.86 Therefore, the bulk of foreign trade between V4 countries and 
China has been and still can be bound to certain products and several (multinational) 
companies. Because the volume of trade is relatively small (compared to, for example, 
V4’s trade with the EU or Germany) one decision of a global company concerning 
relocation or change in internal deliveries among affiliates can significantly change 
the trade volumes of a given country vis-à-vis China.
Trade between countries in the Balkans and China has also risen since 2012. In 
contrast with V4-China trade relations, where Chinese imports increased to a greater 
extent than exports, a 50% increase on the import side and a 65% increase on the ex-
port side can be observed in the Balkans. However, since the starting trade volumes 
were different in the case of imports and exports (imports from China were 5 times as 
many as exports to China in 2012), the trade deficit persisted, although declined a bit. 
The intensity of trade varies from country to country: Greece and Romania are 
China’s most important trade partners from the region, both for imports and exports, 
followed by Slovenia, Serbia and Bulgaria as further important import partners and 
Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia on the export side. China is among the three main 
trade partners of three Balkan countries – Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Based on 
UN Comtrade statistics, currently, all 10 Balkan countries have a trade deficit with 
China, with Romania leading the group, with an enormous 4.425 billion USD trade 
deficit, followed by Greece (3.177 billion USD) and Serbia (2.075 billion USD).
The increase in Chinese imports since 2012 is the highest in the case of Serbia 
and Montenegro (94% and 80%, respectively), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia (all around 50% to 60%) and Slovenia, North Macedonia 
and Greece (around 40%). In Croatia Chinese imports even decreased by 36% during 
the period, potentially due to a decline in purchases of Chinese textile-related pro-
ducts, mainly footwear and apparel.
While Chinese imports in the Balkans are similar to Chinese imports elsewhere 
within the CEE region87, the Chinese export baskets of most of the Balkan countries 
are characterized by low value-added products and/or consist of a few raw materials. 
Montenegro exports almost exclusively aluminum ores and lead ores to China. These 
metals constitute 94% of the country’s exports to China. North Macedonia exports 
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iron alloys which constitute almost 60% of the country’s overall exports to China.88 
Chromium ore exports are responsible for more than 86% of Albania’s exports to 
 China, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina agricultural products (such as lumber and 
beech) and textile products cover up to almost 80%. Although Serbia exports agricul-
tural products (45-55%), such as tobacco and wood, since the launch of the 17+1 initia-
tive a rising share of the machinery, electronics and vehicle sectors89 can be observed. 
Although Bulgaria and Greece are EU members, where production – and exports 
– are usually oriented towards higher added-value products, their Chinese export 
basket shows more similarities with the non-EU countries of the 17 CEECs, which 
is characterized by lower value-added production and exports. Greece exports salt, 
sulphur, cement and mineral fuels (60%) as well as agricultural products such as paper 
waste, olive oil and fruits (10 %) to China, while around 70% of Bulgarian exports 
comprise copper, ores, slag and ash. In contrast, in the case of three other EU member 
countries – Slovenia, Croatia and Romania – the export structure is different from 
the aforementioned countries with machinery, electronic products and vehicles 
 responsible for the major share of their exports to China.
In Slovenia, there is a slight but persistent increase in exports to China after 2015, 
as a result of the upturn in the country’s automotive exports. Apart from components, 
Slovenia did not export to China in this category before, but after 2015, automotive 
accounts for more than 20% of Slovenian exports to China. This shift is probably due 
to Revoz, Slovenia’s only automotive manufacturer and one of the largest exporters, 
starting to produce – and export – Renault and Daimler models, including the new 
Twingo and Smart Forfour. Similarly, from 2016 onwards, there is a significant surge 
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GRAPH 2: TRADE BETWEEN THE BALKAN REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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in Croatian exports to China which can be attributed to transport vehicles, especially 
cargo ships and other vessels. Transport vehicles were previously exported to China 
to a value of only a few million dollars, but in 2016 this category accounted for one 
third of total exports (and then fell slightly in 2017). Other Croatian traditional ex-
port sectors include machinery, electronics and wood. Finally, the main Romanian 
products exported to the Chinese market have been industrial machinery, optical and 
medical apparatuses, electrical machinery, vehicle parts and components, such as car 
tires, together with some textile and agricultural products such as apparel and wood. 
Baltic-China trade has also increased since the inception of the 17+1 initiative. 
Patterns are similar to the V4-China trade relations: Baltic countries’ imports from 
China increased to a much greater extent than their exports to China, as a result the 
trade deficit has risen rapidly.
When it comes to trading with China, the three Baltic countries started from an 
even lower base than the V4-China relations. The increase in Chinese imports since 
2012 is the highest in Lithuania (48%), followed by Latvia and Estonia (29% and 
18%, respectively). Latvia’s and Lithuania’s export performance to China between 
2012 and 2018 seems huge, above 150% in both cases but these figures alone are 
again misleading as both countries started from a low level (below 100 million USD). 
Estonia’s exports to China show a 60% increase but the base was just slightly higher 
in 2012: 135 million USD. 
The main import products from China are electrical and industrial machinery 
and textiles in all three cases. On the export side, however, Baltic countries’ exports 
vary considerably. In Latvia, agricultural products (mainly wood) cover up to 45-50%, 
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GRAPH 3: TRADE BETWEEN THE BALTIC REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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with minerals and metals playing an important part as well. In Estonia, electrical as 
well as industrial machinery and equipment constitute a half of the country’s exports 
to China, while agriculture (wood and fish) represents 30%. In Lithuania, metals, 
machinery and textiles together represent more than 60% of the country’s Chinese 
exports, with agriculture (wood) playing a prominent role too.
Although indirect exports may also play a role, re-exports also have to be taken 
into account. In 2017, for example, re-exports of goods from Lithuania to China in-
creased by almost 62% and reached a value of 48.7 million EUR. The main growth 
drivers were re-exports of machinery and mechanical appliances, mineral fuels and 
mineral oils and electrical machinery and equipment.90 In Estonia re-exports are the 
highest in optical, photo, technical and medical apparatuses, electrical and electronic 
equipment as well as machinery, nuclear reactors and boilers.91 Latvia does not pro-
vide data on exports of Latvian origin or re-exports. However, taking into account 
some similarities in the structure of exports to China with Lithuania, re-exports 
would probably take place in industries such as copper, wood, mineral fuels and oils, 
machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical machinery and equipment as well 
as fruits and nuts.
All three Baltic states have been working hard to improve trade relations with 
China by signing protocols for exporting dairy, meat and fish products as well as pro-
moting their respective countries in China. In general, the Baltic states are not well 
known among Chinese consumers which makes it hard for the companies to sell to 
them. Often better-known labels like EU or Nordic/Northern Europe are used. Thus, 
the trade deficit remains an issue not so easily solved by increasing exports of local 
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GRAPH 4: COMPARING V4, BALTICS AND BALKANS TRADE DATA (IN BILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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produce. Foreign companies like Ericsson contribute greatly to export numbers in 
Estonia, with electronic equipment making up 31% of all exports to China. Also, wood 
and articles of wood tend to be one of the main export categories in the Baltic states 
(24% of exports to China in Estonia, 45% in Latvia, and 17% in Lithuania, whereas 
furniture and prefabricated buildings constituted 22% of Lithuanian exports to China).
To sum up, Visegrád countries are the most important partners from the group of 
17 when it comes to trading with China: in terms of volume the V4 countries import 
from and export to China more than the Baltic countries and the Balkans combined. 
As a result, the trade deficit between the four Visegrád countries and China is is 
many times that of the other two groups. 
The structural picture remains quite stagnant for the whole CEE region, espe-
cially in the case of imports from China, which is in fact similar to imports from 
China to anywhere else in the world (mainly electronics, machinery and textiles). 
This hasn’t changed a lot since 2012, leading to the conclusion that the 17+1 platform 
has not affected the structure of bilateral trade relations with China. 
In contrast, CEE exports to China differ significantly within the region: V4’s ex-
ports to China are dominated by foreign (mainly Western European) multinationals 
and high value-added products, while low value-added products and raw materials 
characterize the Balkans’ exports to China. The Baltic countries lie somewhere in 
between, with both electronics and machinery as well as metals, agricultural and 
textile products in its export basket. 
WE ARE THE CHAMPIONS:  
V4 COUNTRIES AND CHINA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
The share of Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, compared with all the 
invested capital, is still very small, yet in the last few years the capital inflow has 
accelerated significantly. When searching for possible factors that make the region 
a favorable investment destination for China, the cost and quality of labor is to be 
considered first: a skilled labor force is available in sectors for which Chinese interest 
has been growing, while labor costs are lower in CEE than the EU average. How-
ever, there are differences within the CEE region as well; labor costs are lower in the 
Balkans than in the V4 or the Baltics. Nevertheless, these differences don’t seem to 
really influence Chinese investors as – even if more expensive in terms of labor cost 
than the Balkans – there is more Chinese foreign direct investment in the V4 than 
in the Baltics or the Balkans. Other, presumably institutional and political, factors 
might also play a role here.
Similarly to trade relations, CEE countries host Chinese FDI to varying degrees: 
the four Visegrád countries take more than 75% of the total Chinese OFDI to the 
17 CEECs, while the other thirteen countries – despite slight increases in many cases - 
haven’t received significant amounts of Chinese FDI flows so far. The reason behind 
this difference is twofold: 1) Chinese companies prefer EU member states. As Chinese 
companies are often targeting EU markets with their products, they prefer to establish 
or purchase company sites in EU member states to avoid trade barriers such as tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers (e.g. quotas or embargoes) to market access. 2) China plays safe. 
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It targets with FDI Central and Eastern European countries that have already attracted 
investments from elsewhere, for example the US, Japan or Western Europe. Indeed, 
in general, FDI in V4 countries is the highest in the CEE region.
Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors of V4 countries. 
Initially, Chinese investment flowed mostly into manufacturing (assembly), but over 
time services attracted more and more investment.92 The main Chinese investors tar-
geting these countries are interested primarily in telecommunications, elec tronics, the 
chemical industry and transportation.  In addition to the chemical company Wanhua, 
the largest investor in V4, major investors are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Lenovo, 
BYD and Comlink. The ownership structure of the investing Chinese companies is 
rather mixed: some are state-owned companies (such as Wanhua or ZTE) as well as 
nominally private firms (such as Huawei or BYD). However, the majority of private 
companies are so-called national champion companies of China, which assumes home 
country support even if the owner is not directly the Chinese state. 
Regarding the Chinese companies’ entry modes, greenfield investments dominated 
and were especially common for the first Chinese investors (Hisense, Huawei, ZTE, 
Lenovo, TCL) bringing assembly activities to the region in the early 2000s. Since 2011, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) gained importance (Wanhua/Borsodchem, Liu Gong 
Machinery), while there were also examples of founding joint ventures (Orient Solar, 
BBCA, Shanghai Shenda). Hungary has received the majority of Chinese investment 
in the region, followed by Poland and Czechia, while Slovakia lags a little behind due 
to its small size and lack of efficient transport infrastructure. Since Chinese companies 
appreciate a business agreement being supported by the host country’s government, 
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GRAPH 5: CHINESE FDI STOCK IN V4 COUNTRIES (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on OECD data (https://data.oecd.org)
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Hungary’s high-level strategic agreements with foreign companies combined with the 
lack of ‘controversial’ gestures of its political representation spurred Chinese invest-
ment into the country. In the framework of such agreements, Wanhua, for example, 
agreed to establish its European Information Centre in Hungary for developing the 
operations and the supply network of the company93, while the Bank of China pro-
mised to build closer relations with the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency and 
Eximbank, and promotes Hungary in China as a European investment destination.94 
The Balkan countries haven’t so far received big amounts of foreign direct in-
vestment from China, despite the fact that some of them are EU members and others 
potential candidates. Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria are the top recipients; they 
host 80% of Chinese FDI stock in the Balkans (still, it is just one quarter of Chinese 
FDI stock in the Visegrád region). Based on Chinese statistics, countries such as Al-
bania95 and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem not to attract any significant Chinese FDI 
at all (data indicates both are below 10 million USD), while North Macedonia, Monte-
negro, Slovenia and Croatia also host less that 100 million USD Chinese FDI stock. 
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GRAPH 6: CHINESE FDI STOCK IN THE BALKANS (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics, China96
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The above-mentioned trend may soon change, especially in the case of the EU 
member states in the region, as China has become very active in the Balkans recently. 
Chinese PM Li Keqiang visited Croatia for the first time in 2019. On this occasion the 
two countries signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on investment, 
aiming to strengthen economic relations.97 For this purpose, a joint task force for 
investment cooperation was established. Huawei’s interest in contributing to the de-
velopment of smart city solutions in the future, was also addressed. In Slovenia there 
is but one FDI case that is worth mentioning: one of the eight largest manufacturers 
of home appliances in Europe, Gorenje was acquired by Chinese company Hisense 
in 2018 for 339 million USD.98 This purchase went through one of Hisense’s foreign 
subsidiaries, therefore it doesn’t appear in Chinese statistics.
As an EU member state, Romania is the most popular investment destination for 
China in the Balkans. Chinese companies target similar sectors as in the Visegrád 
region. The biggest investors are Huawei, ZTE, China Tobacco International Europe 
Company, Eurosport DHS (bicycle producer), but there are some other important 
Chinese companies that have invested in Romania indirectly, through foreign com-
panies that were purchased by a Chinese company, such as Smithfield99, Pirelli100 
and Nidera101.
Chinese FDI in Bulgaria is less significant compared to Romania, however, it 
also hosts important companies in telecommunications, electronics and automotive 
sectors. The main Chinese investors are Huawei, ZTE, Shanghai Video and Audio 
Electronics Group, Great Wall Motors and Insigma Technology, which operates 
desulfurization facilities. There are examples of FDI into agriculture (Tianjin State 
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GRAPH 7: CHINESE FDI STOCK IN THE BALTICS (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on OECD data (https://data.oecd.org)
Em
pt
y 
sh
el
l n
o 
m
or
e:
 C
hi
na
’s
 g
ro
w
in
g 
fo
ot
pr
in
t i
n 
C
en
tr
al
 a
nd
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e
46
Farms  Agribusiness Group) and rather curiously into the media sector, as recently, 
China Today has entered the Bulgarian newspaper market, sharing the same editors 
and having the same headquarters as Russia Today.
In Serbia Chinese companies started to invest in 2016: the Chinese iron and 
steel manufacturing conglomerate Hesteel Group acquired the Smederevo steel mill, 
saving the financially distressed company as well as 5,000 jobs. Later on a few other 
companies – such as the automotive parts producer Mei Ta – arrived, while a number 
of significant investment projects to Serbia were announced during the visit of Pre-
sident Vučić and his ministers to Beijing in September 2018. The agreements included 
greenfield projects like the construction of a tire factory in Zrenjanin, a Chinese 
takeover of the firm Mining and Smelting Combine Bor (RTB Bor), and construction 
of an industrial park close to Belgrade.102 These FDI cases are closely connected to the 
energy sector which is in line with China’s Belt and Road initiative.
When it comes to Greece, as a newcomer to the 17+1 group, it is hard to evaluate 
the effects of this cooperation on Chinese FDI stock in the country but even before 
joining the group, Greece enjoyed a privileged position since COSCO, China’s ship-
ping giant, operates the Piraeus port. China – together with Hong Kong – belongs 
to the top ten source countries of foreign investment in Greece over the last decade, 
increasing significantly their investment presence during the last few years.103 Chi-
nese companies showed an interest in a wide area of sectors, including infrastructure, 
energy, real estate and high-tech. In one of the latest high-level meetings at ministe-
rial level, the two countries discussed the possibility of future investments in waste 
disposal technologies.104
While the Balkans as a region is the second option for Chinese companies in CEE 
after the Visegrád region, the Baltics comes in third. Even though the Baltic states 
have been mentally quite open to Chinese investments and have made active use of 
the 17+1 format to promote their opportunities, the Baltic region hosts only a bit more 
than 2% of Chinese FDI stock in CEE, 12 times less than the Balkans. 
Two possible reasons for the lower representation of Chinese companies in this 
region are likely: 1) Chinese companies preferred to target countries which are rela-
tively bigger, more populous and closer to Western European markets with their 
greenfield projects. 2) China has been interested in big infrastructure projects or 
M&A deals in the technology sector, where small countries have not much to offer. 
Latvia is the only country in this region that managed to increase Chinese FDI stock 
by 23 times, however, this stock is still only around 100 million USD. The country 
gained some Chinese investments into the real estate sector due to its “golden visa” 
program105. Lithuania has positioned itself as the gateway to Europe for Chinese 
fintech companies and received a few investments in that segment. In Estonia, the 
best-known deal so far has been the takeover of Magnetic MRO by Guangzhou 
Hangxin Aviation Technology for 43 million EUR in 2018. Historically, the top deal 
in the region has been, however, the takeover of Nordic Cinema Group for 865 million 
EUR by AMC Theatres, which at the time of the deal was largely owned by Wanda 
Group, but the company was forced to sell some of its shares later in order to reduce 
its debt in China.106
With the growing awareness of potential challenges from Chinese investments 
to national security, some countries have strengthened their policy and legal frame-
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work to better control such situations. Poland and Hungary have already created 
their own investment screening mechanisms and in Czechia the law is expected to 
be implemented in 2020, while Slovakia seems so far not to be considering drafting 
a law. Latvia established a mandatory review mechanism for transfer in ownership 
of companies and facilities “with significance to national security” or of national and 
European critical infrastructures.107 Lithuania adopted an updated version of the law 
on the protection of “objects of importance to ensuring national security” to require 
notification and facilitate vetting of investments in certain economic sectors or in 
certain protected zones.108 Estonia has not updated the current regulatory frame-
work nor has it established its own mechanism, but it relies on the EU regulation 
on coordination.109 The majority of Balkan states, however, have not even considered 
creating such a mechanism.
Interestingly, where the mechanism was already in place or was in the pipeline, 
it was not necessarily in line with the model defined by the European Commission: 
the Polish law introduced a much more invasive system, allowing the Polish state to 
police more directly the domestic investment market, while the Hungarian system 
utilizes  a rather obscure and politicized oversight mechanism that is less bound by 
all of the principles mentioned in the EU’s regulation.110 However, there has been no 
record yet of a foreign investment project under investigation based on the screening 
mechanisms. Without a sufficient number of records, it is difficult to predict whether 
these rather newfangled screening mechanisms will affect Chinese FDI in the region 
but since governments decide on whether to block a deal or not, the impact will be less 
significant in countries that have stronger, more friendly relationships with China. 
ALL ROADS LEAD TO CHINA:  
COOPERATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND CONNECTIVITY
Interestingly but understandably, the patterns of Chinese infrastructure projects 
in the CEE region are just the opposite of the FDI patterns. Infrastructural projects 
are implemented rather in the non-EU states of the 17CEECs in the Balkans, since 
the infrastructure is relatively poor there, and strict EU rules and regulations do not 
hamper negotiations and processes, while other resources (such as EU structural 
funds) are not available or are less accessible.
In its first infrastructure-building attempts in CEE, China tried to replicate its 
experience from developing countries in Southeast Asia or Africa not considering the 
different (and sometimes very strict) rules and regulations or standards of the EU.111
Currently, China is planning and negotiating several infrastructure-related pro-
jects in the 17 Central and Eastern European countries. China is interested in building 
highways, constructing or reconstructing railways as well as building or expanding 
power plants (among others thermal, hydro, coal-fired as well as nuclear power plants). 
When taking a closer look, a clear link can be found between China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and the 17+1 platform. On one hand, the CEE region is a strategic area for the 
Belt and Road and infrastructure cooperation of this kind can also enhance relations 
between China and the CEE countries. On the other hand, China can also learn from 
the experiences of the 17+1 initiative so far and can use it in its broader Belt and Road 
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strategy.112 Such experiences are, for example, that more effective communication and 
a clearer definition of goals could help in the future to avoid excessive expectations 
and subsequent backlash and doubts.
China’s motivations are easy to understand, as BRI will allow it to expand its 
political and economic sphere of interest. Once the alternative transport routes are 
completed China will be in a more favorable strategic position as it will have more 
alternative transport routes, will be able to reach its target markets easier and faster 
and to work off some of its industrial over-capacities accumulated in recent years. 
In addition, projects completed in the 17 CEECs may provide a reference for further 
Chinese investment in the broader region, especially in Western Europe.
Central and Eastern European countries have been cautiously welcoming of the 
BRI, including V4 countries. Hungary was the first European country to sign a memo-
randum of understanding with China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Budapest 
in June 2015. The Hungarian government was very keen on the railway project and 
when it signed the construction agreement in 2014, Prime Minister Orbán called it 
the most important moment in cooperation between the European Union and China.113
During the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to Warsaw in 2012 China 
offered a special credit line worth 10 billion USD to the CEE region to be used for 
investments in infrastructure, modern technologies and the green economy. This 
credit line was part of 17+1 cooperation, available for all countries gathered in the 
initiative. However, later on it turned out that EU member states could not use those 
funds as certain conditions of this funding opportunity (such as the requirement 
on involvement of Chinese companies and materials) may go against EU rules, for 
example on public procurement regulations.
One of the most salient areas of cooperation between China and the CEE coun-
tries in recent years in terms of connectivity has been in rail freight. The decreased 
cost of rail freight transport, infrastructure improvements and progress in customs 
cooperation among the involved countries leading to shortened travel times have 
injected impressive growth into the China-Europe freight rail connections. With 
their geographical position, the CEE countries are the natural gateway to EU markets. 
Openings of new connections have been used by China to herald the results of the 
cooperation under 17+1 and BRI and have gained significant coverage in Chinese 
state media.
While the first connections between China and Europe – officially branded as the 
China-Europe Express later on – were tested in 2008 by private companies115, they 
have grown exponentially ever since, gaining political support under the BRI and 
17+1 initiatives. While there were only 11 China-Europe trains in 2011, the number 
has grown to 8,255 in 2019.116
The China-Europe express can bring economic benefits for the involved coun-
tries, including from tariff settlements, fees for the use of their rail infrastructure 
and rolling stock and also impetus for the growth of the logistics sector.117 So far, 
the biggest benefactor of the China Europe express connections has been Poland, 
as around 95% of all the connections have taken the route via the Poland-Belarus 
border, using the Małaszewicze terminal.118 The city of Łódź in Poland itself services 
25% of all China-Europe trains.119 
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TABLE 1: LIST OF CHINESE PROJECTS — CONSTRUCTION/RECONSTRUCTION/
EXPANSION — UNDER IMPLEMENTATION OR NEGOTIATION IN 17 CEE COUNTRIES SINCE 
THE INITIATION OF 17+1114
country projects
Albania ‘Blue Corridor’/Adriatic-Ionian see connection (potential); motorway between the Albanian 
Ionian Sea to the Bulgarian Black Sea (potential till 2018, when the Albanian Government 
decided to build it with Albanian companies)
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina
Stanari thermal power plant; Tuzla coal-fired power plant (the credit agreement has been 
signed but the construction works have not started yet); Banovici thermal power plant 
(potential); Banja Luka-Nov Grad motorway; Vukosavlje-Doboj highway and Vukosavlje-Brcko 
branch
Bulgaria Four motorways (Veliko Tarnovo-Russe, Vidin-Botevgrad, Varna-Burgas) and a tunnel under 
the Balkan Mountains (Gabrovo-Kazanlak); Varna port development; modernization of 
the Novi Sad-Subotica railway section (potential); development of a logistic base near to 
Burgas; Belene nuclear power plant; Plovdiv airport management for 35 years (plus potential 
expansion)
Croatia Pelješac Bridge (under construction); modernization of the Zagreb-Rijeka railway;  
Banja Luka-Split motorway (potential)
Czechia New blocks on Dukovany nuclear power plant (company China General Nuclear Power 
Corporation (CGN/CGNPC) raised interest); Hodonín logistic centre (potential, planned  
in 2015)
Estonia Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest); FinEst Bay’s Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel 
(potential)
Greece Further expanding Piraeus port; the development of Athens’ former airport at Hellenikon; 
lignite power plants at Megalopoli and Meliti (both bids failed)
Hungary Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway (planed to be built by 2023)
Latvia Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest)
Lithuania Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest); Klaipeda port (potential);  
Kaunas combined heat power plant (potential)
North  
Macedonia
Kozjak hydro power plant; two stretches on the motorways linking Kichevo-Ohrid and 
Miladinovci-Shtip 
Montenegro Smokovac-Matesevo highway; Bar-Boljare highway; Mozura Wind Park; investment in various 
energy projects (e.g. hydro power plant, thermal power plant – all potential); renewal of the 
country’s ship fleet (potential)
Poland Logistic hubs connected to the Chengdu-Europe Express Rail (for example in Małaszewicze, 
Kutno and Łódź); Jaworzno coal-fired power plant (a Chinese company raised interest, 
a contract has been made but in the end the cooperation failed)
Romania There are no finalized projects yet, despite the many initiatives, such as various nuclear, 
thermal and hydropower plants; the Constanța-Bucharest-Budapest high-speed rail and 
Bucharest-Iași-Chișinău high-speed rail line or the restart of the direct air connection between 
Bucharest and Beijing 
Serbia Danube (“Mihajlo Pupin”) bridge in Belgrade; Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway (planed 
to be built by 2023); the Belgrade-Niš-Preševo railway; construction of the Obrenovac-Ub and 
the Lajkovac-Ljig sections of Corridor XI motorway; the Surcin-Obrenovac section of Corridor 
XI motorway; construction of highway between Belgrade-Zrenjanin and Zrenjanin-Novi Sad 
(planning and technical documentation for the project has already started); 350MW unit at 
Kostolac thermal power plant (credit agreement has already been signed, construction has 
not started yet)
Slovakia There are no projects under implementation. No potential construction projects seem to be 
negotiated. The project of a hydroelectric dam on river Ipeľ was discussed in the past but 
did not come through due to unwillingness of the Slovak government to provide sovereign 
guarantees. 
Slovenia Krško nuclear power plant (potential); Divača-Koper railway line (potential)
Source: authors’ own collection
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Although Slovakia has tried to promote itself as an alternative route, with a tar-
get to process 50% or China-Europe rail cargo, its share has remained negligible.120 
The chief reason has been the situation in Ukraine which several times led to transit 
being stopped completely. Latvia has been another champion of rail freight transport, 
hoping also to take advantage of its ports for further shipment by sea. The Latvian 
Ministry of Transport even has a representative in China, stressing the importance of 
connectivity issues for Latvia which has also spearheaded cooperation with China in 
this area within 17+1. A potential for growth of transport also exists on the so called 
Land-Sea Express Route that joins the port of Pireaus and Central Europe through 
the Balkans and Hungary.121 
However, rail freight cooperation with China is not always smooth. Mirroring 
the overall trade imbalance in China-EU trade, rail transportation has been over-
whelmingly tilted towards inbound cargo to Europe, with trains often returning 
half-empty on the return journey to China. For this reason and also because of the 
overall higher costs of transporting goods to Europe by rail as opposed to sea, the 
connections have been heavily subsidized by local governments in China, leading to 
significant market distortions.122 With the central government planning to gradually 
withdraw the subsidies, it remains to be seen how much of the current trade vol-
ume will continue.123 Finally, despite the lowered costs, rail transport only remains 
competitive for a selected segment of goods, where transport faster than by sea but 
cheaper than by air is necessary.
Since companies and public institutions from EU states have access to more 
attractive forms of funding, including EU structural funds, there are not too many 
infrastructure projects in the V4 or in the Baltics. The  aforementioned Chengdu- 
Europe Express Rail connecting Chengdu with the Polish city Lódź was already in 
operation before the 17+1 cooperation was initiated, and keeps on expanding,124 while 
the Budapest-Belgrade railway – although the contractor has been chosen – won’t be 
ready before 2023. Chinese companies have raised an interest in several projects in 
the V4 region, such as Dukovany nuclear power plant, but V4 countries seems to be 
more cautious with Chinese (as well as Russian) constructors.
While V4 countries are more cautious or bound by EU rules and regulations when 
it comes to Chinese construction projects, the Balkan countries are in a very different 
situation. As seen in the table listing key Chinese projects under implementation or 
negotiation in the 17 CEE countries since 2012, while there are only a few potential 
projects in EU member states, there are a number of potential projects in non-EU 
countries that have either begun or have already been completed.
Also Baltic states have been actively promoting infrastructure development and 
connectivity via land and sea. For a while, talks about potential Chinese investments 
into Klaipeda port have been ongoing, with no concrete results yet. Both Estonia and 
Latvia have been trying to promote their ports to Chinese partners, however, without 
a clear success so far.125 In addition, Latvia has been active within the 17+1 format in 
establishing collaboration in the logistics sector by creating the CEECs-China Sec-
retariat on Logistics Cooperation and trying to open a train route to the region from 
China.126 Rail Baltica is the largest infrastructure project in the region, however, as 
the project is financed by the EU and the three Baltic governments, it remains subject 
to the relevant procurement procedures.127 Another project of potential interest from 
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Chinese companies has become FinEst Bay’s Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel which should 
be finished as early as 2024.128 The implementation of this project is still under dis-
cussion as there is a certain skepticism concerning its completion time as well as its 
profitability.129 
The Baltic states have been keen on building 5G infrastructure and have been 
allegedly willing to collaborate with Huawei on this matter and recent pressure from 
the USA influenced decision-makers in this regard. On 31 October 2019, Estonia 
signed a memorandum with the USA to strengthen cooperation on 5G security and 
development, restricting the use of the Chinese mobile technology company Hua-
wei’s products.130 As a reaction, Huawei announced that it would reconsider continuing 
offering its new models on the Estonian market.131 In Latvia, Huawei’s partner Bite 
Latvija decided to continue to work with Huawei citing other companies in Europe 
such as Deutsche Telekom, Elisa, Orange, Telia Sonera and Vodafone that do so.132 
Furthermore, Latvia’s Tele2 has chosen Huawei for its first 5G handset.133 Lithuania 
has taken a more careful approach, advocating for decisions on Huawei technologies 
to be taken at NATO and EU levels.134 
Attitudes towards 5G and Huawei differ in V4 countries, too. In September 
2019, Poland made a political statement showcasing its support for the US stance 
on 5G by signing a joint US-Poland declaration on 5G.135 However, as of early 2020, 
it seems that the Chinese company will not be completely excluded from the Po-
lish market. The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency issued 
an unprecedented warning against Huawei in 2019, following the announcement 
of the German government which did not exclude Huawei. Nonetheless Prague 
will most likely follow Germany’s approach, despite the US preference.136 Hunga-
ry went even further since the Hungarian MFA already announced in Beijing in 
November 2019 that Huawei would build its 5G wireless network.137 Based on the 
Slovak Prime Minister’s declaration, Slovakia does not seem to consider Huawei 
to be a security threat (in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary).138 
In the Balkans, Romania also signed an MoU with the US, in August 2019, to exclude 
Huawei from 5G network development. Other countries in the region are, how ever, 
less committed. Despite concerns raised in some EU countries, Serbia has been co ope-
rating with Huawei for a long time: “Safe city” and “Smart city” projects have been set, 
while the state-owned telecommunication company Telekom is already working on 
the construction of telecommunication infrastructure that will enable 5G technology 
with Huawei being the key partner in the project. Since the US banned Huawei from 
the construction of 5G infrastructure, the representatives of Serbia have stated that 
there are no concerns regarding Huawei, that they are satisfied with the cooperation 
and that it will be further developed139. 
FOLLOW THE MONEY: FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN V4
When analyzing financial cooperation between China and the CEE region, the 
Visegrád region seems again to be the most active. The Hungarian Minister of Fi-
nance has recently called financial cooperation one of the most rapidly growing areas 
of Hungarian-Chinese relations.140 And indeed, the Bank of China has established 
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a regional and CEE headquarters in Budapest, while Hungary was the first sover-
eign issuer, in 2017, sold government bonds (dim sum and Panda bonds) both on 
the onshore market and in Hong Kong.141 Furthermore, the Hungarian OTP Bank, 
the largest commercial bank in the country, opened its first office in Beijing in 2017. 
Bank of China in Hungary and China UnionPay issued the first Chinese renminbi 
and Hungarian forint debit card in 2017, which was also the first case of a renminbi 
bank card to be issued in Europe by Bank of China.142
When it comes to Chinese banks in the V4, in Hungary and Poland there are 
branches of Bank of China (opened in 2003 and 2012, respectively), while the Czech 
branch of BOC, which was opened in 2015, belongs to the Hungarian branch of the 
bank. BOC doesn’t have any representation in Slovakia although the Slovak PM Fico 
has long lobbied for a Chinese bank to set up operations in Slovakia. Warsaw and 
Prague already host branches of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
while ICBC is, at the time of writing, looking into the possibility of opening a branch 
in Hungary.143 Similarly, Hungary and Poland decided to join the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB), while Czechia considered joining for a while but did 
not initiate it and it is unlikely in the current atmosphere that Czechia would join. 
Slovakia has no immediate intention to participate.
When compared to the Visegrád region, Balkan countries have a relatively weak-
er level of financial cooperation with China. For example, only three of ten Balkan 
countries decided to become members of the AIIB: Romania joined in late 2018, while 
Greece, together with Serbia, joined in summer 2019. The majority of these countries 
lack any Chinese banks in their respective territories. Exceptions include Serbia – 
where the Bank of China opened its first branch (2017), being the first Chinese bank 
in the country, as well as in the Balkan region – and Romania (2019). The Agricultural 
Bank of China also opened its first office in Romania in the same year. The China 
Construction Bank announced its intention to enter Bulgaria in July 2019,144 while 
two banks (BOC and Commercial Bank of China) have expressed their interest in 
entering the Greek market.145 
In the financial sector, China’s UnionPay International (UPI) expanded to Serbia 
(2018), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019). UnionPay has already been work-
ing with the Croatian bank of Privredna Banka Zagreb (PBZ) so that UnionPay cards 
can now be utilized locally. When it comes to Chinese loans to realize the already 
mentioned infrastructure projects in the Balkans, it is usually China Ex-Im Bank 
that finances the projects.
None of the Baltic states has become a member of the AIIB.146 However, within 
the 17+1 format, Lithuania has been the most active in promoting itself as the FinTech 
gateway to Europe by developing a FinTech coordination centre in Vilnius. The Bank 
of Lithuania signed a cooperation agreement with the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission in 2015.147 Since then it has granted four Chinese companies electronic 
money institution licenses and one payment institution license and an additional 
10 companies intend to join the bank’s central payment system Centrolink.148 Coope-
ration has also been established between UnionPay International and Swedbank, one 
of the largest banking groups in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. UnionPay sees 
the Baltic states as emerging travel destinations in Europe for Chinese tourists as 
well as having increasingly closer economic and trade cooperation with Asia Pacific, 
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especially Hong Kong, South Korea and Russia, where UnionPay cards are used on 
a large scale.149 
THE IRRESISTIBLE DRAW: CHINA-CEE TOURISM AS A SUCCESS STORY
The CEE region is becoming an attractive place to visit for the continuously 
expanding Chinese middle class. Over the course of 2018, the top three European 
destinations in terms of volume of Chinese arrivals were the United Kingdom (up 
2.4%), Germany (up 2.6%), and France (up 7.7%), however, the three fastest growing 
destinations were Croatia (up 45.7%), Estonia (up 35.8%), and Hungary (up 25.1%).150
The Visegrád countries are among the most popular destinations for Chinese 
tourists within the CEE region. Since tourist groups from China typically visit their 
destinations as part of a travel package, the majority of them visit at least three – if 
not all – countries of the V4. A Budapest tour is usually merged with a journey to 
Czechia and Austria, while other countries of interest include Poland, Croatia and 
Slovenia. The trend is also contributed to by direct flights between Beijing and major 
V4 cities, such as Budapest, Prague and Warsaw. On average, Chinese tourists spend 
some 12 days in Europe during one visit. 
Prague is the most popular destination for Chinese tourists visiting the V4 region: 
from over 21 million people that visited Czechia in 2018, 619,000 were Chinese.151 
The high number can mostly be put down to the direct flights that opened in the 
last few years between China and Czechia: direct air connections operate between 
Prague and four Chinese cities (Beijing152, Shanghai, Xi’an and Chengdu).
In 2013 at the Bucharest summit, China called upon Hungary to establish  a co-
operation platform in the field of tourism with the aim of increasing tourism co-
operation between China and the CEECs resulting in the establishment of the Central 
and Eastern European Countries’ Tourism Coordination Centre. But, apart from this, 
most of the official tourism agencies have a Chinese language site and/or customized 
travel services for Chinese visitors.
As far as Hungary is concerned, the number of Chinese tourists has grown 
based not only on direct flights (Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xian and recently also 
Chongqing) but also customized services, such as the opening of 14 Hungarian visa 
offices in China or the quick – within 48 hours – issuance of accepted visa applications. 
According to the China National Tourist Office in Budapest, 256,000 Chinese tourists 
visited Hungary in 2018 (while 23,600 Hungarian tourists visited China during the 
same period), and 262,000 tourists arrived in the first 11 months of 2019153. A simi-
lar increase in Chinese tourists has been seen in Poland. The country was designa -
ted - as the only European country – by China Travel Agency magazine as the „New 
Holiday Destination of the Year 2018”. In 2017, a record number of 138,000 Chinese 
tourists visited the country, while these numbers increased even further in 2018.154 
The numbers grew for Slovakia as well. Although the numbers of Chinese tourists 
in Slovakia are lower (61,000 in 2017), it was twice as many as in 2016.155
Among the ten countries in the Balkans, only Greece has a direct flight connec-
tion with China (between Athens and Beijing), operated by Air China since 2017. In 
addition to this already existing connection, another direct flight between Athens and 
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Shanghai has been announced to open in June 2020, operated by the Shanghai-based 
Juneyao Airlines.156 Serbia did have a direct flight connecting Belgrade with Beijing, 
launched in 2017, and operated by the Chinese Hainan Airlines, however, this route 
was closed in November 2018, after one year of operation because it was not profit-
able and carried only a few passengers.157 Before that JAT Yugoslav Airlines launched 
a flight to Beijing in 1979 and operated until late 2000. Romania’s Ponta government 
also wanted to restart the direct air connection between Bucharest and Beijing, with 
the Romanian national airline Tarom, however, the flights were stopped in 2003 due 
to their low profitability. The restart was thus never achieved – the official reason 
given in 2014 was that Russia denied the right for Tarom to fly in its airspace. Chinese 
airlines are also considering launching a direct flight between Zagreb and Beijing, 
while there are further countries from the region, including Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia and Montenegro, that are also seeking to boost the number of 
Chinese tourists visiting their nations with a direct air connection.158 
Even if a direct flight connection is not an option for most of the Balkan coun-
tries to increase the number of tourists from China, they have taken other steps to 
attract Chinese tourists, such as abolishing visa requirements or granting visas free of 
charge. A mutual visa exemption exists between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which took effect in 2018, resulting in a growing number of tourists.159 Serbia has 
had a mutual visa free bilateral policy with China since 2017. This tourist friendly 
system brought over 92, 000 Chinese tourists to Serbia during 2019, five times more 
than in 2016.160 In 2018, Albania also announced a visa-free policy for citizens from 
Bahrain, Belarus, China, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand.161 This 
visa-free policy helped to develop tourism as by June 2018 the number of Chinese 
tourists was estimated at about 8,600, double the number registered in the same 
period of the previous year.162
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Montenegro don’t have any preferential visa policy 
towards China and the number of Chinese tourists is not that significant either. In 
order to boost tourism, the Bulgarian Minister of Tourism has signed an agreement 
with China’s leading tour operator, HiSeas International, and has announced that the 
Bulgarian official tourism portal will be available in Chinese.163 
Romania, too, lacks a preferential visa system for Chinese citizens. However, 
the visa regime for Chinese citizens was simplified in 2017.164 Even so, the number 
of Chinese tourists is very small and the number of visas issued by the Romanian 
embassy in Beijing between 2017 and 2019 averaged around 3,300. Currently,  Croatia 
and Slovenia do not have any preferential visa treatment for Chinese nationals 
either. Nevertheless, the number of tourists has been growing in both countries. 
In 2018 the number of Chinese tourists was estimated at about 250,000 in Croa-
tia while in Slovenia this number has increased by 300% since 2015 when it was 
only 50,000 (0.8% of all tourists).165 To facilitate consumption by Chinese tourists 
within the country, Slovenia has set up payment points for Alipay, the Chinese 
mobile application.166
As mentioned above, the Beijing-Athens direct flight has benefited tourism in 
Greece, along with the involvement of some big Chinese companies that offer special 
tourist packages for Chinese Nationals (e.g. COSCO Shipping, Fosun)167. At present, 
around 200,000 Chinese nationals visit Greece each year.168 Greece has a golden visa 
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program in place that grants five-year residency rights for all investors who make 
strategic investments in Greece (over 250,000 EUR) or buy real estate, with a possi-
bility to renew the residency permit if the investment remains in Greece. After seven 
years of uninterrupted residency a resident can also apply for citizenship.169 In the 
context of this publication, it is worth mentioning that more than 65% of the golden 
visa holders are Chinese.170 
Similar to other regions, tourism is one of the most important industries in 
the Baltic region. In 2019, the Estonian Tourist Board at Enterprise Estonia put out 
a tender to find a partner in China to more actively promote Estonia as a tourism 
destination.171 In 2017, 20,000 tourists arrived from China to Estonia – five times more 
than in 2016.172 In Latvia, the number was 22,774, but declined a bit (-0.2%) the year 
after.173 In Lithuania, in 2018, incoming tourism from distant markets grew rapidly, 
with 20.6% more from China than a year earlier.174 It was especially the success of 
Finland in attracting Chinese tourists that has made the regional players look into 
ways of getting them to move further into other Baltic countries, stay longer and 
spend more. The Estonia-based cruise ship operator Tallink Grupp and some other 
operators in the tourism sector have also introduced Wechat Pay, AliPay as well as 
UnionPay to better serve their Chinese clients.175 In order to promote Latvian busi-
nesses on the Chinese market, the Latvian Investment and Development Agency 
signed an agreement on long term tourism cooperation with the Alibaba Group on 
China’s largest travel website Alitrip in 2017.176 Furthermore, in 2018, China’s CMB 
Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. and airBaltic signed a Letter of Intent for the “sale and 
leaseback” of four Airbus A220-300 aircraft, which coincided with speculation about 
the possibility of direct flights taking off from Latvia to China.177 
It seems that the 17+1 cooperation has led to better promotion of the 17 CEE 
countries which has resulted in an increasing number of Chinese tourists in several 
countries of the region. However, it is not entirely clear whether these developments 
are due to the better promotion of CEE countries in China or China’s expanding army 
of middle class travelers: wealthy Chinese take an average 5.9 international trips per 
year178 and European destinations are on their shortlist. Nevertheless, the CEE re-
gion is far from being “invaded” by Chinese tourists: based on the number of nights 
spent at tourist accommodation in CEE countries by Chinese tourists, calculated by 
Eurostat, Chinese tourists represent less than 1% of all tourists in the region.179 Based 
on the Eurostat dataset, this ratio is the highest in Czechia and Hungary (1,4% and 
1,16% of all tourists) and the lowest in Bulgaria (0.18%).180
THE ECONOMY OF PROS AND CONS:  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on CEE countries is relatively small. CEE countries are 
highly dependent on both trade and investment relations with developed, mainly-EU 
member states, while China represents a minor (although increasing) share. As far as 
trade or investment statistics are concerned, the CEE region is also far from being 
among the most important partners for China.
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Trade relations remain relatively low and unbalanced, leading to an increasing 
trade deficit in all the 17 countries with China. The structure of CEE exports is cha-
racterized by higher value-added products in the case of the Visegrád region,  Lithuania 
and Estonia, while the Chinese export baskets of most of the Balkan countries – with 
the exception of Slovenia, Croatia and Romania – consist of low value-added products 
and/or a few raw materials. 
Chinese FDI are modest and concentrated in a few countries with Hungary, 
Czechia and Poland being at the forefront, with almost no opportunity for the other 
countries to receive big amounts of investment, especially not in the higher value- 
added sectors. Infrastructural projects – financed from Chinese loans – are negotiated 
all over the region but non-EU countries seem to be more open to use this oppor-
tunity while EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe express growing 
reservations in this regard. Although financial cooperation is gaining momentum, it 
is currently limited to EU member countries. 
Tourism is perhaps the real success story of economic cooperation within the 
framework of 17+1, since CEE countries have been achieving higher visibility in 
China, however, the growing number of Chinese middle class travelers may also 
play a role here. 
Although China created the 17+1 platform to deal with the CEE region, it has to 
be emphasized that it still handles its economic affairs on a bilateral basis with the 
CEE countries. Bilateral relations especially with the countries of the Visegrád region 
and Serbia seem to be of particular importance. Relations with other CEE countries 
are lagging behind with with only slightly beneficial or stagnating results.
Most of the CEE countries don’t have a clear China strategy and even if they have 
their own economic intentions, they do not coordinate among themselves. As a result, 
17+1 economic cooperation is mainly driven by China: China sets the agenda that 
the 17 countries rarely question. In order to benefit more from economic cooperation 
with China, CEE countries should work and act together. Regular 17+0 consultation 
meetings – where economic interests and intentions should be gathered – should 
precede 17+1 summits. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation meetings could follow 
the annual summits, where the representatives of the 17 CEE countries can share 
their experience, reservations and plans on how to proceed.
The major challenges of trade relations, such as trade deficit, cannot be overcome 
by single country solutions; CEE countries shoud follow the EU’s strategic aims in 
trade policy. Since a significant portion of CEE’s exports to China is connected to – 
mainly Western European – multinational companies based in CEE, local decisions 
may have less, or even no effect.
Coordinated rules should be established relating to investment screening also 
in non-EU member states. 
When it comes to non-EU countries’ recent rapprochement with China, the 
EU’s responsibility is undeniable: it must play a more active role in these countries’ 
economic development, enhancing their engagement with the EU and providing 
a credible enlargement perspective.
